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Abstract
Social media anomaly detection is of critical importance to prevent malicious activities
such as bullying, terrorist attack planning, and fraud information dissemination. With the
recent popularity of social media, new types of anomalous behaviors arise, causing concerns
from various parties. While a large amount of work have been dedicated to traditional
anomaly detection problems, we observe a surge of research interests in the new realm of
social media anomaly detection. In this paper, we present a survey on existing approaches
to address this problem. We focus on the new type of anomalous phenomena in the social
media and review the recent developed techniques to detect those special types of anoma-
lies. We provide a general overview of the problem domain, common formulations, existing
methodologies and potential directions. With this work, we hope to call out the attention
from the research community on this challenging problem and open up new directions that
we can contribute in the future.
1 Introduction
Social media systems provide convenient platforms for people to share, communicate, and col-
laborate. While people enjoy the openness and convenience of social media, many malicious
behaviors, such as bullying, terrorist attack planning, and fraud information dissemination, can
happen. Therefore, it is extremely important that we can detect these abnormal activities as
accurately and early as possible to prevent disasters and attacks. Needless to say, as more social
information becomes available, the most challenging question is what useful patterns could be
extracted from this influx of social media data to help with the detection task.
By definition, anomaly detection aims to find “an observation that deviates so much from
other observations as to arouse suspicion that it was generated by a different mechanism” [29].
The common approach is to build a reference model, i.e., a statistical model that captures the
generation process of the observed (or normal) data. Then for a new observation, we estimate
its likelihood based on the reference model and predict the data as an “anomal” if the likelihood
is below some threshold [11, 26, 24, 56, 77, 14].
In addition, the type of anomalies that we aim to detect vary significantly from applications
to applications. Several algorithms have been developed specifically for social network anomaly
detection on graph structure anomalies, e.g. power law models [2], spectral decomposition [45],
scan statistics [54], random walks [51, 69], etc. The basic assumption of these algorithms is that
if a social network has fundamentally changed in some important way, it is usually reflected in
the individual communication change, i.e., some individuals either communicate more (or less)
∗Electronic address: qiyu@usc.edu; Corresponding author
1
ar
X
iv
:1
60
1.
01
10
2v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
7 F
eb
 20
16
frequently than usual, or communicate with unusual individuals. However, this could be an
over-simplification of the social media anomalies without considering several important aspects
of social media data.
One of the challenges that differentiate social media analysis from existing tasks in general
text and graph mining is the social layer associated with the data. In other words, the texts
are attached to individual users, recording his/her opinions or activities. The networks also
have social semantics, with its formation governed by the fundamental laws of social behaviors.
The other special aspect of social media data is the temporal perspective. That is, the texts are
usually time-sensitive and the networks evolve over time. Both challenges raise open research
problems in machine learning and data mining. Most existing work on social media anomaly
detection have been focused on the social perspective. For example, many algorithms have been
developed to reveal hubs/authorities, centrality, and communities from graphs [37, 23, 63, 40];
a good body of text mining techniques are examined to reveal insights from user-generated
contents [8, 58]. However, very few models are available to capture the temporal aspects of the
problem [7, 28, 38], and among them even fewer are practical for large-scale applications due to
the more complex nature of time series data.
Existing work on traditional anomaly detection [13, 16, 14, 70, 27, 68, 20, 42, 35, 76, 16, 72]
have identified two types of anomalies: one is “univariate anomaly” which refers to the anomaly
that occurs only within individual variable, the other is “dependency anomaly” that occurs due
to the changes of temporal dependencies between time series. Mapping to social media analysis
scenario, we can recognize two major types of anomalies:
• Point Anomaly: the abnormal behaviors of individual users
• Group Anomaly: the unusual patterns of groups of people
Examples of point anomaly can be anomalous computer users [59], unusual online meetings
[31] or suspicious traffic events [33]. Most of the existing work have been devoted to detecting
point anomaly. However, in social network, anomalies may not only appear as individual users,
but also as a group. For instance, a set of users collude to create false product reviews or threat
campaign in social media platforms; in large organizations malfunctioning teams or even insider
groups closely coordinate with each other to achieve a malicious goal. Group anomaly is usually
more subtle than individual anomaly. At the individual level, the activities might appear to be
normal [12]. Therefore, existing anomaly detection algorithms usually fail when the anomaly is
related to a group rather than individuals.
We categorize a broad range of work on social media anomaly detection with respect three
criteria:
1. Anomaly Type: whether the paper detects point anomaly or group anomaly
2. Input Format: whether the paper deals with activity data or graph data
3. Temporal Factor: whether the paper handles the dynamics of the social network
In the remaining of this paper, we organize the existing literature according to these three
criteria. The overall structure of our survey paper is listed in table 1. We acknowledge that the
papers we analyze in this survey are only a few examples in the rich literature of social media
anomaly detection. References within the paragraphs and the cited papers provide broader lists
of the related work.
We can also formulate the categorization in Table 1 using the following mathematical ab-
straction. Denote the time-dependent social network as G = {V (t),Wv(t), E(t),We(t)}, where
V is the graph vertex, Wv is the weight on the vertex, E is the graph edge and We is the weight
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Table 1: Survey Structure
Point Anomaly Detection
Activity-based
Bayes one-step Markov, compression[59], multi-step Markov [34],
Poisson process [33], probabilistic suffix tree [67]
Graph-based
random walk [48, 65],
power law [2, 4]
(static graph)
hypergraph [62, 61]
spatial autocorrelation[66, 15]
Graph-based scan statistics [54, 52], ARMA process [39]
(dynamic graph) MDL [64, 3], graph eigenvector [32]
Group Anomaly Detection
Activity-based
scan statistics [18, 25], causal approach [5]
density estimation [73, 74, 49, 57]
Graph-based
MDL [9, 43, 55]
anomalous substructure [50, 22]
(static graph) tensor decomposition [46]
Graph-based random walk [44], t-partitie graph [75, 36]
(dynamic graph) counting process [30]
on the edge. Point anomaly detection learns an outlier function mapping from the graph to
certain sufficient statistics F : G→ R. A node is anomalous if it lies in the tail of the sufficient
statistics distribution. Group anomaly detection learns an outlier function mapping from the
power set of the graph to certain sufficient statistics F : 2|G| → R. Activity based anomaly
detection collapses the edge set E(t) and weights We(t) to be empty. Static graph-based ap-
proaches fix the time stamp of the graphs as one. Now each of the method summarized in the
table is essentially learning a different F or using some projection (simplification) of the graph
G. The projection trades-off between model complexity and learning efficiency.
2 Point Anomaly Detection
Point anomaly refers to the abnormal behaviors of individual users, which can be reflected
in abnormal activity records such as unusually frequent access to important system files, or
abnormal network communication patterns. Point anomaly detection aims to detect suspicious
individuals, whose behavioral patterns deviate significantly from the general public. Based on
the type of input, we can have activity-based point anomaly detection and graph-based point
anomaly detection.
2.1 Activity-based Point Anomaly Detection
User activities are widely observed in social media, such as computer log-in/log-off records,
HTTP access records, and file access records. Activity-based approaches assume that individuals
are marginally independent from each other. The anomalousness of an individual is determined
only by his own activities. A large body of literature are in the context of computer intrusion
detection study. For example, [59] investigates the problem of detecting masquerades who
disguise themselves as somebody else on the network. The paper collects user activities by
looking at their UNIX commands records and manipulating the data to simulate masquerades.
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Pioneering work for detecting masquerades fall into the framework of statistical hypothesis
testing, e.g. [21, 34]. Different approaches are proposed including Bayes one-step Markov,
hybrid multi-step Markov and compression. Here we omit other simple masquerade detec-
tion techniques such as uniqueness of the command as also compared in [21]. For Bayes one-step
Markov method, it states the null hypothesis as a one-step Markov process and the alterna-
tive hypothesis as a Dirichlet distribution. The null hypothesis assumes that the current time
command Cut of a user u relates to his previous command Cu,t−1. Mathematically speaking,
H0 : P (Cut = k|Cu,t−1 = j) = pukj , where pukj is the transition probability from command j to
command k for user u. Then the algorithm computes the Bayes factor based on the hypothesis
for each user x¯u and set up a threshold with respect to x¯u to detect anomalous masquerades.
This approach models users independently and ignores the potential relationships among users.
As a direct generalization of Bayes one-step Markov, [34] builds a user model based on
high-order Markov chains: hybrid multi-step Markov. It tests over two hypotheses. H0 :
commands are generated from the hybrid Markov model of u; H1 : commands are generated from
other users. The hybrid multi-step Markov method switches between the Markov model and the
independence model. The Markov model assumes that a command depends on a set of previous
commands, i.e. P (Cut = c0|Cu,t−1 = c1, Cu,t−2 = c2, · · · , Cu,t−l = cl) =
∑l
i=1 λuiru(c0|ci),
where λ and r denotes the initial and transitional probability. For the independence model,
it assumes that a user’s commands are i.i.d samples from a multinomial distribution. The
paper computes the test statistics by combining the statistics from two models. Similar to
Bayes one-step Markov, hybrid multi-step Markov method sets up a threshold value on the
test statistics to flag anomalies. Hybrid multi-step Markov method is able to capture the long-
range dependence of the users’ commands. However, it also suffers from higher computational
cost. Compression takes a distinctive approach where it defines the anomaly score as the
additional compression cost to append the test data to the training data. Formally, the score
is x = compress({C, c}) − compress(C), where C is the training data, c is the testing data.
The method applies the Lempel-Ziv algorithm for the compression operation. However, it can
hardly capture the dependencies in the data instances.
[67] proposes probabilistic suffix tree (PST) to mine the outliers in a set of sequences S
from an alphabet Σ. It makes Markov assumption on the sequences and encodes the variable
length Markov chains with syntax similar to Probabilistic Suffix Automata. In PST, an edge
is a symbol in the alphabet and a node is labeled by a string. The probabilistic distribution of
each node represents the conditional probability of seeing a symbol right after the string label.
An example of such PST is shown in Figure 1. The algorithm first constructs a PST and then
computes a similarity measure score SIMN based on marginal probability of each sequence over
the PST. Then it selects the top k sequences with lowest SIMN scores as outliers. Since PST
encodes a Markov chain, which has been shown to have certain equivalence to the Hidden Markov
model, the outliers detected by PST are similar to those using Markov model testing statistics.
Though PST construction and SIMN are relative cheap in computation, one drawback is that
PST is pre-computed for a fixed alphabet. Pre-computation makes PST less adaptive to the
unseen symbols outside of the alphabet or newly coming sequences, which basically requires
recomputing the entire tree.[33] inves igates Markov-modulated Poisson process to address the specific problem of
event detection on time-series of count data. The algorithm assumes the count at time t, denoted
as N(t), is a sum of two additive processes: N(t) = N0(t) + NE(t), where N0(t) denotes the
number of occurrences attributed to the “normal” behavior and NE(t) is the “anomalous” count
due to an event at time t. More concretely, the periodic portion of the time series counts can
be taken as “normal” behavior while the rare increase in the number of counts can correspond
to the “anomalous” behavior. For both processes, the paper develops a hierarchical Bayesian
model. In particular, the paper models periodic counting data (i.e. normal behavior) with a
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Figure 1: An example of PST and pruning it using
MinCount or Pmin. The probability distribution
vectors are shown on the top of the nodes, and the label
strings, the number of times they appear in the dataset
and their empirical probability are shown within the
nodes
The node also records a probability distribution vector
of the symbols, which corresponds to the conditional
probabilities of seeing a symbol right after the label
string in the dataset. For example, the probability
vector for the node labelled bba is (0.947,0.053). This
means the conditional probability of seeing a right after
bba (P (a|bba)) is 0.947, and seeing b right after bba
(P (b|bba)) is 0.053.
The structure of PST is similar to the classical
suffix tree (ST). However, there are some important
differences. Besides keeping a probability distribution
vector at each node, in a PST, the parent of a node is a
suffix of the node, while in a classical ST the parent of
a node is a prefix of the node.
2.1 Pruning of a PST
The size of a PST is a function of the cardinality of
the alphabet (|Σ|) and maximum memory length L. A
fully grown unchecked PST is (O(|Σ|L). Several pruning
mechanisms have to be employed to control the size of
the PST.
Bejerano and Yona [5] have proposed a two-step
mechanism to prune a PST. In the first step, an
empirical probability threshold Pmin is used to decide
whether to extend a child node. For example, at the
node labelled bb, if P (abb) ≥ Pmin, the node with
label string abb will be added to the PST under some
conditions. Otherwise, the node itself, including all its
descendants will be ignored. The formula of computing
P (abb) is listed in Table 1
In the second step, a tree depth threshold L is
employed to cut the PST. This means when the length
of the label string of a node reaches L, its children nodes
will be pruned.
Instead of using Pmin, Yang and Wang [15] sug-
gested the use of minCount for pruning a PST. For
each node, the number of times its label string appears
in the database is counted. If this number is smaller
than minCount, then the node (and therefore all its
children) are pruned.
In Figure 1 both Pmin and MinCount are shown
in each node for ease of exposition. However, it is not
necessary to keep them in the PST. The dashed and
the solid lines show examples of pruning the PST using
Pmin = 0.02 and MinCount = 25 respectively.
2.2 Computing Probabilities Using a PST
The probability associated with a sequence s over a PST
is PT (s) = PT (s1)P
T (s2|s1) . . . PT (sl|s1s2...sl−1). The
PST allows an efficient computation of these intermedi-
ate conditional probability terms.
For example let us compute PT (b|abab) from the
PST in Figure 1. The search starts from the root
and traverse along the path → b → a → b, which
is in the reverse order of string abab. The search
stops at the node with label bab, because this is the
longest suffix of abab that can be found in the PST,
and PT (b|abab) is estimated by PT (b|bab) = 0.8. Thus,
we are exploiting the short memory feature, which
occurs in sequences generated from natural sources: the
empirical probability distribution of the next symbol,
given the preceding subsequence, can be approximated
by observing no more than the last L symbols in that
subsequence [12, 5].
If the PST is pruned using minCount = 25, the
search stops at the node with label ab and PT (b|abab)
is estimated by PT (b|ab) = 0.394. The following is an
example to compute the probability of string ababb over
the PST pruned using minCount = 25.
PT (S) = PT (a)PT (b|a)PT (a|ab)PT (b|aba)PT (b|abab)
= 0.612× 0.028× 0.606× 0.032× 0.394
= 1.309 ∗ 10−4
Since the probabilities are multiplied, care must be
taken to avoid the presence of zero probability. Thus,
a smoothing procedure is employed across each node
of the PST and the probability distribution vector is
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Figure 1: A example of PST. For each node, top array shows the probability distribution. I side
the node shows the label string, the number of times it appears in the data set and the empirical
probability. [67]
Poisson process and models rare occurrences (i.e. anomaly behavior) via a binary process. The
algorithm then uses the MCMC sampling algorithm to infer the posterior marginal distribution
over events. It uses the posterior probability as an indicator to automatically detect the presence
of unusual events in the obs rvation sequence. The paper applies the model to detect the events
from free-way traffic counts and the building access count da a. The method takes a full
Bayesian approach as a principled way to pose hypothesis testing. However, it treats each
time series as independent and fails to consider the scenario where multiple time series are
inter-correlated.
Another application in social network anomaly detection is proposed in [31]. The paper
proposes to detect unusual meetings by investigating the presence of meeting participants.
Specifically, for each time stamp t = 1, 2, · · · , the inputs are given as a snapshot of the network
in the form of a binary string xt = (xt(1), · · · , xt(n)) ∈ {0, 1}n, where xt(j) = 0 or 1 indicates
whether the jth person participated in the meeting at tim t as well as the feedback from expert
system with the correct labels yt ∈ {−1,+1}. The algorithm outputs a binary label for each
network state yˆt ∈ {−1,+1} according to whether or not xt is anomalous. Under the pro os d
two-stage framework, “filtering stage” estimates the model parameters and updates beli f with
the new observation. It builds an exponentially model driven by a time-vary parameter and
learns the model parameter in an online fashion. “Hedging stage” compares the model likelihood
of xt as ζt with the critical threshold τt and flag anomalies if ζt > τt. After that, the online
learning algorithm utiliz s the feedback from an expert sys em to adjust the critical threshold
value τt+1 = argminτ (τ − τt−ηyt1yˆt 6=yt)2. It is easy to see from the construction of xt that each
person’s participation is taken as an independent feature entry. Though this work highlights the
network structure, the relational information utilized lies only between people and meetings,
without considering the interaction among people themselves.
Generally speaking, activity-based approaches model the activity sequence of each user sep-
arately under certain Markov assumption. They locate the anomaly by flagging deviations
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from a user’s past history. These approaches provide simple and effective ways to model user
activities in a real-time fashion. The models leverage the tool of Bayesian hypothesis testing
and detect anomalies that are statistically well-justified. However, as non-parametric methods,
Markov models suffer from the rapid explosion in the dimension of the parameter space. The
estimation of Markov transition probabilities becomes non-trivial for large scale data set. Fur-
thermore, models for individual normal/abnormal activities are often ad hoc and are hard to
generalize. As summarized by [60] in his review work on computer intrusion detection: “none
of the methods described here could sensibly serve as the sole means of detecting computer
intrusion”. Therefore, exploration of deeper underlying structure of the data with fast learning
algorithms is necessary to the development of the problem. Here we also refer interested readers
to more general reviews of computer network anomaly detection [1, 41].
2.2 Graph-based Point Anomaly Detection
Social media contain a considerably large amount of relational information such as emails from-
and-to communication, tweet/re-tweet actions and mention-in-tweet networks. Those relational
information are usually represented by graphs. Some approaches analyze static graphs, each
of which is essentially one snapshot of the social network. Others go beyond static graph and
analyze dynamic graphs, which is a series of snapshot of the networks.
2.2.1 Static Graph
Compared with activity-based approaches, which simplify the social network as categorical or
sequential activities of individuals, graph-based approaches further take into account the rela-
tional information represented by the graph. [50] immerses as one of the earliest work focusing
on graph-based anomaly detection. It introduces two techniques for graph-based anomaly detec-
tion. One is to detect anomalous substructures within a graph and the other is to detect unusual
patterns in distinct sets of vertices (subgraphs). Substructure is a connected component in the
overall graph. Subgraph is obtained by partitioning the graph into distinct structures. Each
substructure is evaluated using the Minimum Description Length metric for anomalousness. In
real social graphs, intensive research efforts have been devoted to study the graph properties
(see references in [10]). One famous example is the power law, which describes the relationship
among various attributes, namely the number of nodes (N), number of edges (E), total weight
(W ) and the largest eigen-value of the adjacency matrix (λ).
Based on these observations, [2] proposes to study each node by looking at power law
property in the domain of its “egonet”, which is the subgraph of the node and its direct neigh-
bors. For a given graph G, denote the egonet of node i as Gi, the paper describes the “OddBall”
algorithm. The algorithm starts by investigating the number of nodes Ni, the weight Wi and
number of edges Ei of the egonet Gi. It then defines the normal neighborhoods patterns with
respect to these quantities. For example, the authors report the Egonet Density Power Law
(EDPL) pattern for Ni and Ei: Ei ∝ Nαi , 1 ≤ α ≤ 2. ; the Egonet Weight Power Law
(EWPL) pattern for Wi and E
β
i , β ≥ 1. Given the normal patterns, the paper takes the
distance-to-fitting-line as a measure to score the nodes in the graph. The algorithm can detect
anomalous nodes whose neighbors are either too sparse (Near-star) or too dense (Near-clique).
By studying both the total weight W and the number of edges E, it can detect anomalous nodes
whose interactions with others are extremely intensive. By analyzing the relationship between
the largest eigenvalue λ and the total weight W , it can detect dominant heavy link, or a single
highly active link in an egonet. The “OddBall” algorithm builds on power law properties of
complex networks, which haven been verified in various real world applications. Moreover, the
fitting of power law and the calculation of anomaly score is computationally efficient, which
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makes the algorithm a good fit for large scale network analysis. However, the algorithm would
easily fail if the network does not obey the power law, then the detected anomalies would be less
meaningful. Also, the paper focuses only on the static network and generalization the algorithm
to dynamic network is non-trivial.
Besides the power law, random walk is also adapted for graph-based anomaly detection
between neighbors. The general idea is that if a node is hard to reach during the random
walk, it is likely to be an anomaly. Random walk calculates a steady state probability vector,
each element of which represents the probability of reaching other nodes. Following the idea
of random walk, [65] focuses on the anomaly detection on bipartite graph, denoted as G =
〈V1
⋃
V2, E〉, where node sets V1 has k nodes, V2 has n nodes and E are the edges between
them. It detects anomalies by first forming the neighborhood and then computing the normality
scores. During neighborhood formation stage, the algorithm computes the relevance score for
a node b ∈ V1 to a ∈ V1 as the number of times that one visit b during multiple random walks
starting from a. In this case, the steady state vector represents the probability of being reached
from V1 in a random walk with restart model, and the algorithm detects anomalies linked to
the query nodes. Random walk model stresses the graph structure while ignores the nodes’
attributes. Sometimes, it might be an over-simplification of the underlying network generating
process, which would lead to high false positive ratio.
[48] uses similar random walk guideline to detect outliers in a database and proposes the
“OutRank” algorithm. It first constructs a graph from the objects where each node represents a
data object and each edge represents the similarity between them. For every pair of the objects
X,Y ∈ Rd, the algorithm computes the similarity Sim(X,Y ) and normalizes the resulting
similarity matrix to obtain a random walk transition matrix S. Then it defines the following
connectivity metric based on how well this node is connected to the other nodes:
Definition.(Connectivity) Connectivity c(u) of node u at tth iteration is defined as follows:
ct(u) =
a if t = 0∑
v∈adj(u)
(ct−1(v)/|v|) otherwise
where a is its initial value, adj(u) is the set of nodes linked to node u, and |v| is the
node degree. This recursive definition of connectivity is also known as the power method for
solving eigenvector problem. Upon convergence, the stationary distribution can be written as
c = ST c. The algorithm detects the objects (nodes) with low connectivity to other objects
as anomalies. “OutRank” solves individual activity-based anomaly detection problem using a
graph-based anomaly detection method. As a general outlier detection framework, it requires
the construction of the graph from data objects. Thus its performance can heavily rely on the
type of similarity measurement adopted for computing the edges.
Despite a wealth of theoretical work in graph theory, standard graph representation only
allows each edge to connect to two nodes, which cannot encode potentially critical information
regarding how ensembles of networked nodes interacting with each other [62]. Given this consid-
eration, a generalized hypergraph representation is formulated which allows edges to connect
with multiple vertices simultaneously. In hypergraph, each hyperedge is a representation of a
binary string, indicating whether the corresponding vertex participates in the hyperedge. Figure
2 provides an example for comparing the graph and the hypergraph representation of two obser-
vations 111111000 and 000101111, with p = 9, using a graph and a hypergraph. With the graph,
representing one observation of an interaction requires multiple edges. With a hypergraph, one
hyperedge suffices. Due to the mapping between binary strings and hyperedges, the paper for-
mulates the graph-based anomaly detection problem in the corresponding discrete space. [62]
and [61] address the problem of detecting anomalous meetings in very large social networks
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based on hypergraphs. In their papers, a meeting is encoded as a hyperedge x and g(x) is the
probability mass function of the meetings evaluated at x. The distribution of the meetings is
modeled as a two-component mixture of a non-anomalous distribution and an anomalous event
distribution g(x) = (1 − pi)f(x) + piµ(x), with pi as the mixture parameter. Then the paper
learns the likelihood of each observation using variational EM algorithm with a multivariate
Bernoulli variational approximation. The likelihood is subsequently used for the evaluation of
the anomalousness. Hypergraph is specifically designed for high dimensional data in the graph.
It provides a concise representation of the complex interactions among multiple nodes. But the
representation only applies to binary relationships where an edge is either present or missing.
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Fig. 1
MODELING TWO OBSERVATIONS, 111111000 AND 000101111, WITH p = 9, USING A GRAPH (TOP) AND A HYPERGRAPH
(BOTTOM). WITH THE GRAPH, REPRESENTING ONE OBSERVATION OF AN INTERACTION REQUIRES MULTIPLE EDGES. WITH
A HYPERGRAPH, ONE HYPEREDGE SUFFICES. THE HYPERGRAPH IS MORE EFFICIENT FOR STORING/REPRESENTING
OBSERVATIONS AND MORE INFORMATIVE ABOUT THE REAL STRUCTURE OF THE DATA.
II. ANOMALY DETECTION ON HYPERGRAPHS
Let H = {V , E} be a hypergraph [7] with vertex set V and hyperedge set E . Each hyperedge,
denoted x 2 E , can be represented as a binary string of length p. Bits set to 1 correspond to
vertices that participate in the hyperedge. In this setting, we may approximately equate E with
{0, 1}p, i.e. the binary hypercube of dimension p. (We say “approximately” due to the existence
of prohibited hyperedges, namely the origin, x = 0, and all x within Hamming distance 1 of the
origin, which correspond to interactions between zero or one network nodes. The impact of this
precluded set becomes negligible for very large p and is omitted from this paper for simplicity
of presentation.) This is a finite set with 2p elements. We define g(x) to be the probability mass
function (pmf) over E , evaluated at x.
Hypergraphs provide a more natural representation than graphs for multiple co-occurrence data
of the type examined in this paper. For example, one could consider using a graph to represent
co-occurrence data by having each vertex represent a network node and using weighted edges to
connect vertices associated with observed co-occurrences. As Figure 1 illustrates, using a graph
in this manner would imply connecting any pair of vertices appearing in an observation with an
edge. The edge structure of a graph is usually represented as a p⇥p symmetric adjacency matrix
with p
2
(p 1) distinct elements, so that even converting observations into a collection edge weights
could be enormously challenging computationally. As Figure 1 illustrates, two observations can
Figure 2: Modeling two observations, 111111000 and 000101111, with p = 9, using a graph (top)
and a hypergraph (bottom). With the graph, representing one observation of an interaction
requires multiple edges. With a hypergraph, one hyperedge suffices. The hypergraph is more
efficient for storing/representing observations and more informative about the real structure of
the data. [62]
[66, 15] consider using spatial auto-correlation to detect local spatial outliers. We cate-
gorize them as graph-based approach because the spatial neighborhood defined in those meth-
ods resembles the neighborhood defined in graph. For each point o, the paper defines the
Spatial Local Outlier Measure (SLOM) as d˜(o) ∗ β(o) to score its anomalousness. According
to their definition, d˜ is the “stretched” distance between the point and its neighbors and β
is the oscillating parameter. SLOM captures the spatial autocorrelation using d˜ and spatial
heteroscedasticity(non-constant variance) with β. However, when the data is of high dimen-
sions, the concept of neighborhood becomes less well-defined. The local anomaly defined in the
proposed method using local spatial statistics would suffer from the “curse of dimensionality”.
Generally speaking, static graph-based approaches consider not only the activity of individ-
ual users but also their interactions. The common practice is to extract important node features
from the graph, which relies heavily on feature engineering. Some algorithms import graph the-
oretical properties such as the power-law or the random walk into the analysis. However, those
approaches usually make strong assumptions on the graph generating process, which can be
easily violated in real world social networks.
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2.2.2 Dynamic Graph
Social networks are dynamic in nature. Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the problem of
anomaly detection in a dynamic setting. A brief survey on dynamic network anomaly detection
is elaborated in [6]. The survey characterizes the techniques employed for the problem into three
groups: Time Series Analysis of Graph Data, Anomaly Detection using Minimum Description
Length, Window Based Approaches. Based on this categorization, we review those anomaly
detection approaches that incorporate the network dynamics into their models.
Dynamic networks can be represented as a time series of graphs. A common practice is
to construct a time series from the graph observations or substructures. [53] uses a number
of graph topology distance measures to quantify the differences between two consecutive net-
works, such as weight, edge, vertex, and diameter. For each of these graph topology distance
measures, a time series of changes is constructed by comparing the graph for a given period
with the graph(s) from one or more previous periods. Given a graph G = {V,E,WV ,WE},
the algorithm constructs a time series of changes for each graph topology distance measures.
Each time series is individually modeled by an ARMA process. The anomaly is defined as
days with residuals of more than two standard errors from the best ARMA model. The paper
detects anomalies by setting up a residual threshold for the goodness of model fitting for time
series. The proposed method in [53] is designed for change point detection. The performance
of the proposed algorithm highly depends on how the graph topology distance measures are
defined. Additionally, the distance measure is only able to capture the correlation between two
consecutive time stamps rather than long-range dependencies.
Graph eigenvectors of the adjacency matrices is another form of the time series extracted
from dynamic graph streams. In [32], the paper addresses the problem of anomaly detection
in computer systems. Assume a system has N services, the paper defines a time evolving
dependency matrix D ∈ RN×N , where each element of the matrix Di,j is a function value relate
to the number of service i’s requests for service j within a pre-determined time interval. Given
a time series of dependency matrices D(t), the algorithm extracts the principal eigenvector u(t)
of D(t) as the “activity” vector, which can be interpreted as the distribution of the probability
that a service is holding the control token of the system at a virtual time point. To detect
anomalies, the authors define the typical pattern as a linear combination of the past activity
vectors r(t) = c
∑
i=1Wviu(t− i+ 1), where {vi} are the coefficients and c is the normalization
constant. Then the algorithm calculates the dissimilarity of the present activity vector from
this typical pattern. The anomaly metric z(t) is defined as z(t) = 1 − r(t − 1)Tu(t). When
the anomaly metric quantity z(t) is greater than a given threshold, the system flags anomalous
situation. Compared with representing graphs with edges, weights and vertices as in [53],
features built upon eigenvectors capture the underlying invariant characteristics of the system
and preserve good properties such as positivity, non-degeneracy, etc.
Besides time series analysis of the graph stream, Minimum description length (MDL)
has been applied to anomaly detection as another way of characterizing the dynamic networks.
[64] detects the change points in a stream of graph series. It introduces the concept of graph
segment, which is one or more graph snapshots and the concept of source/destination partitions,
which groups the source and destination nodes into clusters. Figure 3 illustrates those concepts
in a three graph series. The rational behind the algorithm is to consider whether it is easier
to include a new graph into the current graph segment or to start a new graph segment. If a
new graph segment is created, it is treated as a change point. Given current graph segment
G(s), encoding cost co and a new graph G(t), the algorithm computes the encoding cost for
G(s)⋃{G(t)} as cn and G(t) as c. If cn − co < c, the new graph is included in the current
segment. Otherwise, {G(t)} forms a new stream segment and time t is a change point. To
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compute the encoding cost of a graph segment, the algorithm tries to partition the nodes in
a segment into source and destination nodes so that the MDL for encoding the partitions is
minimized. In this case, a change point indicates the time when the structure of the graph has
dramatically changed. One limitation of this algorithm is that it can only handle unweighted
graphs, which cannot encode the intensity of the communication between users. Thus, this
method does not fit the situation when the communications of people suddenly increase while
the topological structure stays unchanged. (e.g. a heated discussion starting to prevail in a
social network).
Figure 2: Notation illustration: A graph stream with 3
graphs in 2 segments. First graph segment consisting
of G(1) and G(2) has two source partitions I
(1)
1 = {1, 2},
I
(1)
2 = {3, 4}; two destination partitions J(1)1 = {1}, J(1)2 =
{2, 3}. Second graph segment consisting of G(3) has three
source partitions I
(2)
1 = {1}, I(2)2 = {2, 3}, I(2)3 = {4}; three
destination partitions J
(2)
1 = {1}, J(2)2 = {2}, J(2)2 = {3}.
is between (i) the number of bits needed to describe the
communities (or, partitions) and their change points (or,
segments) and (ii) the number of bits needed to describe
the individual edges in the stream, given this information.
We begin by first assuming that the change-points as well
the source and destination partitions for each graph seg-
ment are given, and we show how to estimate the bit cost
to describe the individual edges (part (ii) above). Next, we
show how to incorporate the partitions and segments into
an encoding of the entire stream (part (i) above).
4.1 Graph encoding
In this paper, a graph is presented as a m-by-n binary
matrix. For example in Figure 2, G(1) is represented as
G(1) =
0BB@
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
1CCA (1)
Conceptually, we can store a given binary matrix as a bi-
nary string with length mn, along with the two integers m
and n. For example, equation 1 can be stored as 1100 0010 0011
(in column major order), along with two integers 4 and 3.
To further save space, we can adopt some standard lossless
compression scheme (such as Hu man coding, or arithmetic
coding [8]) to encode the binary string, which formally can
be viewed as a sequence of realizations of a binomial random
variable X. The code length for that is accurately estimated
as mnH(X) where H(X) is the entropy of variable X. For
notational convenience, we also write that as mnH(G(t)).
Additionally, three integers need to be stored: the matrix
sizes m and n, and the number of ones in the matrix (i.e.,
the number of edges in the graph) denoted as |E| 1. The
1|E| is needed for computing the probability of ones or ze-
ros, which is required for several encoding scheme such as
Hu man coding
cost for storing three integers is log⇥|E|+log⇥m+log⇥n bits,
where log⇥is the universal code length for an integer2. Notice
that this scheme can be extended to a sequence of graphs in
a segment.
More generally, if the random variable X can take values
from the set M , with size |M | (a multinomial distribution),
the entropy of X is
H(X) =  Px⇤M p(x) log p(x).
where p(x) is the probability that X = x. Moreover, the
maximum of H(X) is log |M | when p(x)= 1|M| for all x ⌦M
(pure random, most di⌅cult to compress); the minimum is
0 when p(x) = 1 for a particular x ⌦ M (deterministic and
constant, easiest to compress). For the binomial case, if all
symbols are all 0 or all 1 in the string, we do not have to
store anything because by knowing the number of ones in
the string and the sizes of matrix, the receiver is already
able to decode the data completely.
With this observation in mind, the goal is to organize the
matrix (graph) into some homogeneous sub-matrices with
low entropy and compress them separately, as we will de-
scribe next.
4.2 Graph Segment encoding
Given a graph stream segment G(s) and its partition as-
signments, we can precisely compute the cost for transmit-
ting the segment as two parts: 1) Partition encoding cost:
the model complexity for partition assignments, 2) Graph
encoding cost: the actual code for the graph segment.
Partition encoding cost
The description complexity for transmitting the partition
assignments for graph segment G(s) consists of the following
terms:
First, we need to send the number of source and destina-
tion nodes m and n using log⇥m+log⇥n bits. Note that, this
term is constant, which has no e ect on the choice of final
partitions.
Second, we shall send the number of source and destina-
tion partitions which is log⇥ks + log
⇥⌘s.
Third, we shall send the source and destination partition
assignments. To exploit the non-uniformity across parti-
tions, the encoding cost is mH(P ) + nH(Q) where P is a
multinomial random variable with the probability pi =
m
(s)
i
m
and m
(s)
i is the size of i-th source partition 1 ⌃ i ⌃ ks).
Similarly, Q is another multinomial random variable with
qi =
n
(s)
i
n
and n
(s)
i is the size of i-th destination partition,
1 ⌃ i ⌃ ⌘s.
For example in Figure 2, the partition sizes for first seg-
ment G(1) are m(1)1 = m(1)2 = 2, n(1)1 = 1, and n(1)2 = 2; the
partition assignments for G(1) costs  4( 2
4
log( 2
4
)+ 2
4
log( 2
4
)) 
3( 1
3
log( 1
3
) + 2
3
log( 2
3
)) bits.
In summary, the partition encoding cost for graph seg-
ment G(s) is
C(s)p := log
⇥m+ log⇥n+ log⇥ks + log
⇥⌘s + (2)
mH(P ) + nH(Q)
2To encode a positive integer x, we need log⇥x   log2 x +
log2 log2 x+ . . ., where only the positive terms are retained
and this is the optimal length, if the range of x is un-
known [19]
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Figure 3: A graph stream with 3 graphs in 2 segments. First graph segment consisting of
G(1) and G(2) has two source partitions I
(1)
1 = {1, 2}, I(1)2 = {3, 4}; two destinatio partitions
J
(1)
1 = {1}, J (1) =2= {2, 3}. Seco segment con isting of G(3) has three source partitions
I
(2)
1 = {1}, I(2)2 = {2, 3}, I(2)3 = {4}; three destination partitions J (2)1 = {1}, J (2)2 = {2},
J
(2)
3 = {3}. [64]
[3] addresses the categorical anomaly detection by pattern-based compression, which also
adopts MDL-principle. It encodes a database with multiple code abl s and searches for the best
partitioning of features using MDL-optimal rule. With the natural property of code tables, the
algorithm declares the anomaly by the pattern that has long code word, which re rarely used
and have high compression cost. The method has been successfully generalized to a broad ra ge
of data. The use of mul ipl od tables to describe the dat in the proposed algorithm exploits
the correlations between groups of features. But the partition of the features into groups would
impose unrealistic independence assumptions on the data.
For window-based approach, sca statistics is the main-stream method. The idea of
scan statistics is to slide a small window over local r gions, comput g certain local statistic
(number of events for a point pattern, or average pixel value for an image) for each wi dow.
The supremum or maximum of these locality statistics is known as the scan statistic. [54]
specifically discusses a framework of using scan statistics to perform anomaly detection on
dynamic graphs. Specifically, the algorithm defines the scan region by considering the closed
kth-order neighborhood of vertex v in graph D = (V,E): Nk[v;D] = {w ∈ V (D) : d(v, w) ≤ k}.
Here distance d(v, w) is the minimum directed path length from v to w in D. The induced
subdigraph Ω(N)(Nk[v;D]) is thus the scan region and any digraph invariant Ψk(v) of the scan
region is the locality statistics. For instance, the out degree of the igraph can be one such
invariant locality statistics. The scan statistic Mk(D) is th maximum locality statistic over all
vertices. The algorithm applies hypothesis testing by stating the null hypothesis (normality)
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and the alternative hypothesis (anomaly). Digraphs with large scan statistic indicates the
existence of the anomalous activity and are rejected under null hypothesis with certain threshold.
Extension of scan statistics from standard graph to hypergraph representation is also examined
in [52] for time-evolving graphs. The scan statistic is an intuitively appealing method to evaluate
dynamic graph patterns. But one drawback of this type of method is the necessity to pre-specify
a window width before one looks at the data.
3 Group Anomaly Detection
Group anomaly or “collective anomaly” detection in social network aims to discover groups of
participants that collectively behave anomalously [12]. This is a challenging task due to three
reasons: (1) we do not know beforehand any members of a malicious group; (2) the members
of anomalous groups may change over time; (3) usually no anomaly can be detected when we
examine individual member. Most existing algorithms can only address one or two of these
challenges.
3.1 Activity-based Group Anomaly Detection
Activity-based group anomaly detection approaches usually assume that the group information
is given beforehand and devote the most effort to model the activities within groups. Those
approaches also imply that groups are marginal independent with each other.
[19] proposes a probabilistic model to detect group of anomalies in categorical data sets.
It generalizes the spatial scan statistic in [54] for dynamic graphs to non-spatial data sets
with discrete valued attributes. It uses Bayesian networks to model the relationship between
the attributes and computes the group score for all subsets of the data S based on the model
likelihood: F (S) = P (Data|H1(S)P (Data|H0) . Under this definition, H0 is the null hypothesis that no anoma-
lies are present, and H1(S) is the alternative hypothesis specifying subset S is an anomalous
group. Then it performs a heuristic search over arbitrary subsets of the data to find the groups
that maximize the likelihood. At the final stage, it performs randomization testing to eval-
uate the statistical significance of the detected groups. For spatial data, the computation of
scan statistics involves a definition of scanning region, which is often based on geographical
properties. Non-spatial categorical data has the difficulty in defining local statistics based on
geographical properties. Therefore, the efficient search heuristic is critical to the performance
of algorithm. On the other hand, it lacks the solid theoretical justification and is sensitive to
model mis-specification.
[18] considers the anomalies in categorical data sets and tries to detect anomalous attributes
or combinations of attributes. The paper proposes two algorithms to test for anomalous records,
i.e Conditional Probability Test and Marginal Probability Test. Conditional probability test uses
conditional probability as the testing statistic. For two attributes at, bt, the algorithm considers
the ration r(at, bt) =
P (at)P (bt)
P (at,bt)
. Marginal probability computes a quantity called the q-value,
which is the cumulative probability mass of all the attributes q-val(at) =
∑
x∈X P (x) where
X = {x : P (x) ≤ P (at)}. Q-value is in parallel with the p-value. This approach concerns with
empirical distribution functions and is parameter free. But the underlying distributions of the
attributes would heavily depend on the sample size of the data.
Another line of work formulates the group anomaly detection problem as a density esti-
mation task. It imposes a hierarchical probabilistic model on the normal groups and estimates
the distribution of the latent variables in the model. It evaluates the likelihood of the estimated
latent variables for individual group and use it as a test statistic. The Multinomial Genre Model
(MGM) proposed in [73] first investigates the problem following the paradigm of latent models.
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MGM models groups as a mixture of Gaussian distributions with different mixture rates. For-
mally, given M groups, each of which has Nm objects. MGM assumes that the object features
Xm.n are generated from a mixture of K Gaussian, m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , n = 1, 2, · · · , Nm with a
set of stereotypical mixture rates χ. The mixture rates of the M groups belong to one of the
stereotypical mixture rates in χ. Figure 3.1 depicts the graphical model of the proposed model.
The method then performs Bayesian inference to estimate the density of the mixture rate for
each group. Then group anomaly detection is conducted by scoring the mixture rate likelihood
of each group. This method finds groups whose topic variables {Zm, n} are not compatible with
any of the stereo- typical topic distributions in χ. In MGM, groups share the candidate topics β
globally, which leads to bad performance when groups have different sets of topics. [74] further
extends MGM to Flexible Genre Model (FGM) with more flexibility in the generation of topic
distributions, as shown in Figure 4. The motivation of FGM is to allow each group to have
its own topics. Specifically, they change the set of topics β from model hyper-parameters to
random variables, depending on the genre parameter η. This extension enables the model to
adapt to more diverse genres in groups.
Apart from the generative approach used in MGM and FGM, [49] takes a discriminative
approach to estimate the density of the mixture model. It uses the same definition of group
anomaly from [73] and represents groups as probability distributions. The authors consider
kernel embedding of those probabilistic distributions. For two probabilities P1 and P2, the ker-
nel on probability distributions is defined as K(P1,P2) =
∫ ∫
k(x, y)dPi(x)dPj(y), where k is a
reproducing kernel in reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS). They generalize the technique
of one-class support vector machine (OCSVM) for point anomaly detection to group anomaly
detection. Similar to OCSVM with translation invariant kernels, the authors compute the ker-
nel of Gaussian distributions and apply SVM in a probability measure space. Interestingly, the
proposed one class support measure machine (OCSMM) algorithm has inherent correspondence
to the kernel density estimation, which is theoretically more attractive. Compared with genera-
tive approaches in [73, 74], OCSMM does not make assumptions on the underlying distribution
of the data and is generally less computational expensive. However, due to the use of Gaussian
RBF kernels and support vector machine, the algorithm is inevitably sensitive to the selection
of kernels as well as the soft margin parameter. [5] takes a casual approach to detect the
Liang Xiong, Barnabas Poczos, Jeff Schneider
think of these objects as ‘red’, ‘blue’, and ‘emissive’
galaxies, and each group Gm is a set of Nm objects,
each object can be one of the K different types. Intro-
duce the SK = {s ∈ RK |sk ≥ 0,
∑K
k=1 sk = 1} nota-
tion for theK-dimensional probability simplex, and let
χt ∈ SK for all t = 1, . . . , T , and χ = {χ1, . . . ,χT } de-
note the set of T possible non-anomalous distributions
(proportions) of theK different objects (red, blue, and
emissive galaxies) in the M groups.
Now we can ask the question whether in groupGm the
distribution of these red, blue, and emissive galaxies
looks normal, that is, they look similar to a distribu-
tion in χ = {χ1, . . . ,χT }, or we have found a group,
where this distribution seems far from the distribu-
tions that we can see in the other groups.
In the following sections we will propose two generative
probabilistic models that can help us to answer this
question and detect anomalous groups.
4 The Hierarchical Models
In this section we introduce our generative models that
describe the normal, that is the non-anomalous data,
and then we show how we can detect anomalous groups
using these models. Our proposed models are inspired
by the LDA, however, there are very significant differ-
ences that we will explain later.
4.1 The Uni-Modal Model
The LDA model is a generative probabilistic model
originally proposed for modeling text corpora. First
we briefly review this model, and then explain how
we can extend this discrete model to be able to find
anomalous groups in a data set given by any real
vector-valued feature representation.
In the original LDA model the data set is a text corpus,
that is a collection of M documents. Each document
Gm is a set of Nm words, and each document is repre-
sented by a randommixture over latent topics, which is
characterized by a distribution over words. Formally,
let Dir(π) denote the Dirichlet distribution with pa-
rameter π, and let M(θ) be the multinomial distri-
bution with parameters θ ∈ SK . In the LDA model
given some nonnegative hyperparameters π ∈ RK+ , we
generate first some θm ∈ SK (m = 1, . . . ,M) from the
Dir(π) distribution (θm ∼ Dir(π)). Having these K
dimensional θm vectors (topic distributions) we gener-
ate Zm,n ∼M(θm) variables (n = 1, . . . , Nm) indicat-
ing which topic is active out of K when we generate
the wordXm,n ∼ P (·|Zm,n,β). Here β = {β1, . . . ,βK}
is a dictionary of K f -dimensional probability vectors
(βk ∈ Sf ), and P (·|Zm,n,β) =M(βZm,n) is a multino-
mial distribution with parameters βZm,n . While this
model has been shown to be very successful for mod-
eling discrete data, such as text corpora, in its original
form it cannot be used for modeling real, vector-valued
observations. Thus we modify this model slightly. In-
stead of using M(βZm,n) for the observations, we as-
sume βi = {βµi ,βΣi } to be a mean value (βµi ∈ Rf )
and a covariance matrix (βΣi ∈ Rf×f ), and our obser-
vations are given by:
Xm,n ∼ P (·|Zm,n,β) = N (βµZm,n ,βΣZm,n).
We call this model Gaussian-LDA (GLDA).
With GLDA we can model real, vector-valued obser-
vations, but it has a serious problem when we want to
apply it for group anomaly detection. GLDA learns
that each group is a certain mixture of K Gaussian
components, but it also assumes that there is only one
“best” mixture (topic distribution) for all groups, be-
cause Dir(π), the distribution of topic distributions
θ ∈ SK , is uni-modal i.e. it peaks at a single point.
While this is acceptable when used as the prior in
LDA, it is too restrictive when used to model multi-
modal distributions of topic distributions. To address
this issue w extend the GLDA model with the previ-
ously mentioned χ term, the set of the typical topic dis-
tributions (proportions of the Gaussian components).
4.2 The Multi-Modal Model
In this section we introduce the Mixture of Gaussian
Mixture Model (MGMM) model that extends GLDA
with a set of typical topic mixtures/distributions,
and hence can resolve the previously mentioned uni-
modality problem. The graphical representation of
this new model can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The MGMM Model
Let again χt ∈ SK for all t = 1, . . . , T , and χ =
{χ1, . . . ,χT } denote the set of possible non-anomalous
probability distributions of the K different topics (red,
blue, and emissive galaxies) in the M groups. Let
π ∈ ST denote a distribution vector on the set χ, and
let β = {βµk ,βΣk }Kk=1 be a dictionary of the possible
mean values and covariance matrices.
The generative process of the MGMM model is de-
scribed in Algorithm 1. Note that this model is differ-
(a) Multinomial Genre Model
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Figure 1: The Flexible Genre Model (FGM).
global distributions P (·|⌘). Thus, the topics can be adapted to local group data, but the information
is still shared globally. Moreover, the topic generators P (·|⌘) determine how the topics { m,k}
should look like. In turn, if a group uses unusual topics to generate its points, it can be identified.
To handle real-valued multidimensional data, we set the point-generating distributions (i.e., the top-
ics) to be Gaussians, P (xm,n| m,k) = N (xm,n| m,k), where  m,k = {µm,k,⌃m,k} includes
the mean and covariance parameters. For computational convenience, the topic generators are
Gaussian-Inverse-Wishart (GIW) distributions, which are conjugate to the Gaussian topics. Hence
⌘k = {µ0,0, 0, ⌫0} parameterizes the GIW distribution [17] (See the supplementary materials
for more details). Let ⇥ = {⇡,↵, ⌘} denote the model parameters. We can write the complete
likelihood of data and latent variables in groupGm under FGM as follows:
P (Gm, ym, ✓m, m|⇥)
=M(ym|⇡)Dir(✓m|↵ym)
Y
k
GIW ( m,k|⌘k)
Y
n
M(zmn|✓m)N (xmn| m,zmn).
By integrating out ✓m, m and summing out ym, z, we get the marginal likelihood ofGm:
P (Gm|⇥) =
X
t
⇡t
Z
✓m, m
Dir(✓m|↵t)
Y
k
GIW ( m,k|⌘k)
Y
n
X
k
✓mkN (xmn| m,k)d md✓m.
Finally, the data-set’s likelihood is just the product of all groups’ likelihoods.
4 Inference and Learning
To learn FGM, we update the parameters ⇥ to maximize the likelihood of data. The inferred latent
states—including the topic distributions ✓m, the topics  m, and the topic and genre memberships
zm, ym—can be used for detecting anomalies and exploring the data. Nonetheless, the inference
and learning in FGM is intractable, so we train FGM using an approximate method described below.
4.1 Inference
The approximate inference of the latent variables can be done using Gibbs sampling [11]. In Gibbs
sampling, we iteratively update one variable at a time by drawing samples from its conditional
distribution when all the other parameters are fixed. Thanks to the use of conjugate distributions,
Gibbs sampling in FGM is simple and easy to implement. The sampling distributions of the latent
variables in group m are given below. We use P (·| ⇠) to denote the distribution of one variable
conditioned on all the others. For the genre membership ym we have that:
P (ym = t| ⇠) / P (✓m|↵t)P (ym = t|⇡) = ⇡tDir(✓m|↵t).
For the topic distribution ✓m:
P (✓m| ⇠) / P (zm|✓m)P (✓m|↵, ym) =M(zm|✓m)Dir(✓m|↵ym) = Dir(↵ym + nm),
where nm denotes the histogram of the K values in vector zm. The last equation follows from the
Dirichlet-Multinomial conjugacy. For  m,k, the kth topic in groupm, one can find that:
P ( m,k| ⇠) / P (x(k)m | m,k)P ( m,k|⌘k) = N (x(k)m | m,k)GIW ( m,k|⌘k) = GIW ( m,k|⌘0k),
4
(b) Flexible Genre Model
Figure 4: Graphical Model Representation of Multinomial Genre Model and Flexible Genre
Model for activity-based group anomaly detection.
contextual anomaly. The paper proposes to encode the variables in the Bayesian network and
use probabilistic association rule to discover anomalies. The association rule builds upon two
measures namely support and confidence. Support describe the prior probability of a v riable
while confidence represents the conditional probability. Given a state variable X and observa-
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tions Y , the paper defines the two measures as follows suppport(X = xi) = P (X = xi) and
confidence(X = xi) = Pa(X = xi|Y ), where Pa is the parent nodes of X in the Bayesian
network. The algorithm detects the domain specific anomalous patterns (DSAP) based on two
probabilistic association rules: 1) low support and high confidence 2) high support and low
confidence. Then it sorts the detected DSAPs according to sensitivity analysis scores and con-
siders the top τ patterns with the lowest scores as output anomalies. Different from MGM or
FGM, the proposed method operates on the general Bayesian network rather than a specific
probabilistic model. The evaluation of support and confidence on each node is relatively cheap
compared with full Bayesian inference. However, the detected causal anomalies would be ad
hoc. The false positive rate would increase sharply with larger size Bayesian networks.
3.2 Graph-based Group Anomaly Detection
The most common observations we have in social networks are the individual attributes as well
as ties among participants. Graph-based group anomaly detection techniques seek to jointly
utilize these observations and detect anomalous groups in a unified framework.
3.2.1 Static Graph
Anomalous edge detection has been proposed in [9] based on graph partitioning. The algorithm
aims to detect anomalous edges that deviate from the overall clustering structure. The rationale
behind this method is that if the removal of an edge can significantly make the graph easier
to partition, then the two linked nodes may have an anomalous relation. The partitioning
algorithm tries to find the best number of partitions so that the Minimal Description Length
(MDL) needed to encode and transmit all the partitions of the graph is minimized. For a graph
with n nodes, the paper defines the group mapping G : {1, 2, ..., n} → {1, 2, · · · , k} to assign
nodes into k clusters. Thus, the Total Encoding Cost for the graph T (D; k,G) in the form of
the adjacency matrix D = [di,j ] depends on the number of the clusters k as well as the group
mapping of the nodes G. Anomalous edges are those edges whose removal would significantly
reduce the total graph encoding cost. In the paper, the anomaly score of an edge is defined as
the total encoding cost difference to transmit the new partitions when the edge is removed, i.e,
“outlierness” of edge (u, v) := T (D′; k,G)− T (D; k,G). D and D′ are equal of all edges except
that d′u,v = 0. Other similar work includes [43], which defines a rarity measure to discover
unusual links, and [55], which uses a Katz measurement to statistically predict the likelihood
of a link. Edge anomaly detection focus merely on pair-wise relationship and is not feasible for
detecting more complicated anomalous behaviors with more than two people involved.
Finding anomalous substructure in graphs is another topic of attention. For example, in
the scenario of email exchanges within a company, email correspondence between managers and
their secretaries should be normal (frequent pattern), while email exchange between assembly
line workers and secretaries could be an anomalous pattern. [50] presents an iterative expanding
algorithm to look for rare substructures using their SubDue system [17]. Given a labeled graph,
where each node has a label identifying its type, the system starts with a list holding 1-vertex
substructures for each unique vertex label. It modifies the list by generating, extending, deleting
or inserting vertices and edges. One central issue is how to measure the anomalousness of a
substructure. Simply counting the number of occurrences for substructures is not enough,
as larger substructures tend to have low occurrences. [50] intuitively defines a score for a
substructure S in a graph G as F2 = Size(S) ·Occurrences(S,G), which is simply the product
of the total number of nodes within a substructure and its occurrences. A smaller value of F2
indicates a more abnormal substructure. Another issue of the problem is the computational
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complexity of the algorithm. Although [17] shows that in practice the system runs in polynomial
time, theoretically it faces exponential number of substructures.
The pioneering work of [50] sees the rise of mining substructures in graphs. [46] leverages
the structural information in the heterogeneous networks to detect unusual subgraph patterns.
The algorithm encodes the graph using a tensor and focuses on finding the suspicious spikes via
tensor decomposition. Formally, given an M-mode tensor X of size I1 × I2 × · · · × IM , the
algorithm performs CP decomposition of the tensor of rank R as X ≈∑Rr=1 λr(a(1)r × · · · a(M)r ),
where {a(i)r } are rank-1 eigenscore vectors. The approximation would be exact when R equals the
true rank of the tensor. Next the algorithm transforms the eigenscore vector plot (absolute value
of eigenscore vs. attribute index) into the eigenscore histogram (absolute value of eigenscore
vs. frequency count) and conducts spike detection on the histogram. The proposed approaches
bridges graph mining and tensor analysis. Tensor decomposition is able to capture the complex
structure in heterogeneous networks. But tensor decomposition problem itself can be NP-hard
to solve. And the lack of explicit objective in the proposed anomaly detection framework would
create difficulties in the final evaluation of the algorithm’s performance.
In the setting of fraudulent activity detection, [22] jointly considers anomalous substructure
and the criteria of MDL. Specifically, they run the SUBDUE system with MDL heuristics
to find the normative pattern in the graph. Instances of substructure are evaluated against
the normative pattern with a match cost. Anomalous substructures are the ones with the
lowest matches. Based on this definition of group anomaly, [22] presents three slightly different
algorithms, i.e. GBAD-MDL, GBAD-P and GBAD-MPS to detect anomalies. These methods
first find all the instances of frequent substructures and evaluate the frequency of the abnormal
structure multiplied by the match cost. A key drawback of this method is that it assumes that
the degree of nodes in a graph is uniformly distributed, which is almost impossible in most
social networks. As shown in [47, 10], real graphs usually follow power law degree distribution
instead of uniform distribution.
π p Gpaα Rpa Xpa
zp→q zp←q
Ypq
θm
βk
N ×N
M
ApN
K
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Figure 5: Plate representation for the GLAD model
In social media, two forms of data coexist: one is the point-wise data, which characterize
the features of an individual person. The other is pair-wise relational data, which describe the
properties of social ties. Density estimation methods for group anomaly detection [73, 74, 49]
emphasize on the point-wise data and usually overlook the pair-wise relational data. Graph-
based methods highlight the graph structure but usually fail to account for the attributes
of individual nodes. Additionally, existing group anomaly detections algorithms are all two-
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stage approaches: (i) identify groups, (ii) detect group anomalies. This strategy assumes that
the point-wise and pair-wise data are marginally independent. However, such independence
assumption might underestimate the mutual influence between the group structure and the
feature attributes. The detected group anomalies can hardly reveal the joint effect of these two
forms of data.
With those considerations, [57] proposes to build an alla prima that can accomplish the
tasks of group discovery and anomaly detection all at once. They develop a hierarchical Bayes
model: the GLAD model, for detecting the group anomaly. The GLAD model utilizes both
the pair-wise and point-wise data and automatically infers the group membership and the role
at the same time. It models a social network with N individuals. Assuming that each person
p is associated with a group identity Gp and a role identity Rp. By groups, it means the
clusters that capture the similarity suggested by the pair-wise communications. By roles, it
refers to the mixture components that categorize the point-wise feature values of the nodes.
For simplification, they fix the number of groups as M and the number of roles as K. Figure 5
shows the plate notation for the GLAD model.
For each person p, he joins a group according to the membership probability distribution
pip. GLAD imposes a Dirichlet prior on the membership distribution. It is well known that the
Dirichlet distribution is conjugate to the multinomial distribution. It assumes the pair-wise link
Yp,q between person p and person q depends on the group identities of both p and q with the
parameter B. Furthermore, it models the dependency between the group and the role using a
multinomial distribution parameterized by a set of role mixture rate {θ1:M}. The role mixture
rate characterizes the constitution of the group: the proportion of the population that plays
the same role in the group. Finally, it models the activity feature vector of the individual Xp
as the dependent variable of his role with parameter set {β1:K}.
GLAD defines the group anomaly based on the role mixture rates, it scores the group
anomalousness using −∑p∈G〈log p(Rp|Θ)〉p. The most anomalous group will have the highest
anomaly score. In practice, it approximates the true log likelihood with the variational log
likelihood to get −∑p∈G〈log p(Rp|Θ)〉q. A limitation of GLAD is that it only models the static
network. This might be restrictive if we want to further consider dynamic networks. Besides the
anomaly group whose mixture rate deviates significantly from other groups, it is also interesting
to study how the mixture rate evolves over time.
3.2.2 Dynamic Graph
Evolving networks can also provide insights into the temporal changes of groups. Detecting
anomalously groups in dynamic graphs is more challenging, as the group structures are not
fixed and the unusual patterns in the group can also change.
[25] take a bipartite graph of individual entities and sequential ordered attributes as inputs
and returns a group of entities whose attributes sequences are less likely to be generated from
the proposed Markov chain model. One example of this type of anomaly is that several people
constantly jump from companies to companies together. They track the complete history of
employments and disclosures, and recognize the tribes that are closely related. Formally, the
method requires bipartitie graph G = (R
⋃
A,E), where R = {ri} is the entity representatives,
A = {aj} is the attributes and E are edges with time interval annotation. For each edge e ∈ E,
e = (ri, aj , tstartij , tendij). The method begins by listing the co-worker relationships in the
graph. Every pair fij = (ri, rj) indicates the individuals that have worked together. This
results in a new graph H = (R,F ), where edges in the new graph F = {fij} is annotated with
individuals attribute and history information. Then the paper defines a significance score for
each edge, which measures the significance or the anomalousness of shared jobs. The algorithm
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proceeds by identifying significant edges and computing the significance score c for each of
them. Then the proposed method picks a threshold d for the scores and prune all the edges fij
for cij < d. After pruning, the connected components in the remaining graph (which should
be quite sparse after the pruning) are regarded as anomalous groups, or tribes as referred in
the paper. As also pointed by authors, the choice of scoring pairs constitutes the heart of the
problem, thus posing difficulty in the selection
[71] directly analyze graph structures and efficiently track node proximity, which measures
the relevance between two nodes in bipartite graphs. The paper defines a dynamic proximity
score based on the probability to “random walk” from one to the other in the static graph.
Low proximity to other nodes can in a way indicate anomaly. Their definition of dynamic
proximity accounts for two important aspects of node relevance: proximity involves multiple
snapshots of the graph; proximity does not drop over time. [71] extends this method to track
anomalous nodes in time evolving graphs by defining a dynamic proximity metric. This dynamic
proximity is derived from the edge and weight differences between graph snapshots and preserves
a monotonicity property.
[44] proposes to detect the significant changing subgraphs. Given two consecutive snapshots
of a graph Gi−1 and Gi, the algorithm defines an importance score to measure the accumu-
lative change of a node’s closeness to its l-step neighbors (neighbors within l hops from the
node) between two consecutive graph slices. In their context, random walk with restart is
used to model the node relevance. The closeness of a pair of vertices vj and vk is defined as
Πl(j, k) =
∑
τ :vj=→vk;length(τ)≤l p(τ)c(1−c)length(τ), where τ is a path from vj to vk whose length
is length(τ) with transition probability p(τ). The importance score is therefore the summation of
the closeness changes of vj to the other nodes, defined as V Ii(vj) =
∑
vk∈Vi |Πli−1(j, k)−Πli(j, k)|
. Note that two consecutive graph slices Gi and Gi+1 have the same set of nodes, but their edge
set could be different. With the node closeness Πli and the vertex importance score V I, the pa-
per uses a strategy similar to density clustering to detect the significant subgraphs. Specifically,
the algorithm puts the most important node in the current subgraph g, adds all of its l-step
neighbors to a max-heap. As long as there exists a node whose closeness with node t exceeds
certain threshold, the algorithm iteratively moves t from the heap into g. When the iteration
terminates, g is regarded as the anomalous subgraph, and the algorithm proceeds to generate
anomalous subgraphs for the next timestamp. The proposed algorithm detects subgraphs with
significant change in edges as group anomalies. The incremental learning of nodes closeness
changes makes the algorithm quite efficiently. However, the output subgraphs heavily rely on
the threshold for the closeness, and there is no clear mapping between the nodes’ closeness and
anomalousness.
In another work which tries to detect changing communities by [36], the authors pro-
pose two-stage density-based clustering algorithm CHRONICLE. The algorithm first clus-
ters nodes in each snapshot graph Gi at time Ti using structural similarity σ, defined as
σ(v, w) = |N(v)
⋂
N(w)|√
|N(v)|×|N(w)| , where N(v) is the neighborhood nodes of v. Then the algorithm
replaces each cluster with one node to form a t-partite graph, as shown in Fig. 6. In the
t-partite graph, the edge weight between two nodes (dashed edges in Fig. 6) within a time
stamp Ti denotes the number of edges between the two clusters, and the edge weight between
two nodes from two consecutive time stamps is defined as the Jaccard similarity between the
node sets of two clusters. In the second stage, SCAN is applied again on the t-partite graph.
In Fig. 6 different colors represents different clusters in the t-partite graph. From these clusters
we can clearly monitor the formation and dissolving of the groups, which could provide some
hint on which groups are anomalously changing. However, the algorithm is originally designed
for monitoring community evolution instead of anomalous changing group detection. It is not
clear how the algorithm can be adapted for anomaly detection yet.
[30] also presents a two-stage method, which combines the Bayesian approach for discrete
activity modeling with the graph analysis techniques for discovering anomalous structures. In
16
CHRONICLE: A Two-Stage Density-based Clustering of Dynamic Networks 3
works, it has also some weak points: (1) finding only stable clusters of single
path (i.e., a sequence of local clusters over time); (2) finding a very small number
of clusters (i.e., the most stable top-k clusters); (3) not being scalable w.r.t. the
length of dynamic networks; and (4) using a large amount of memory depending
on its parameters. All these weak points are caused by the fact that the BFS
method is based on a dynamic programming (DP) algorithm. Besides the clusters
of single path type, actually, there are many cohesive clusters of non-single path
type in t-partite graph. Figure 2 shows an example of t-partite graph over three
timestamp networks. Each network has 3∼4 local clusters. The numbers on lines
between T1 and T2 (or T2 and T3) indicate that they have a non-zero similarity.
When k = 1, the BFS method finds a single path cluster c11c21c31 because it has
the strongest similarities between local clusters. However, if some members in
c12 transfer to c24, some members in c13 to c23, and the members in c23 and c24
are merged into c33, then there could be another cluster like (c12c13)(c23c24)c33,
where the similarity between (c12c13) and (c23c24) and the similarity between
(c23c24) and c33 might be very high (i.e., very cohesive) although the similarity
of each single path (e.g., c13c23c33) are not so high. Here, () represents a consol-
idation of multiple local clusters. We call a cluster of this type as a path group
cluster since there are multiple paths over time in the cluster. The BFS cannot
find the clusters of this type.
Fig. 2. An example of t-partite graph constructed from a dynamic network.
In this paper, we propose a density-based clustering algorithm, CHRONI-
CLE, that efficiently discovers both single path clusters and path group clusters.
For finding clusters of both types, CHRONICLE performs the density-based
clustering in two stages: the 1st-stage density-based clustering for each times-
tamp network and the 2nd-stage density-based clustering for the t-partite graph.
In case of the previous BFS method, it only performs the 1st-stage clustering
and finds single path clusters by using a DP algorithm. A density-based clus-
tering approach has several advantages such as discovering clusters of arbitrary
shape, handling noise, and being fast. These features allow us to find a wider
range of clusters (i.e., not only single path clusters, but also path group clusters)
in an efficient way. As the length of dynamic networks, the number of clusters,
or the length of cluster (i.e., path length) increases, the running time and the
amount of memory usage of the BFS method largely increase. Using disk for sav-
Figure 6: An example of t-partite graph constructed from a dynamic network (taken from [36]).
Each circle at a time stamp Ti represents a cluster in the snap hot graph Gi.
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Figure 7: Plate representation for the Dynamic Group Latent Anom ly Detection (DGLAD)
model
the first stage identifies potentially anomalous nodes by conjugating Bayesian models for discrete
time counting processes. Specifically, it models the number of communications made from i
to j up until discrete time t denoted by Nij(t) as a counting process. It learns the distributions
of the counts and use predictive p-value to evaluate the new observations for anomalous nodes.
In the second stage, standard network inference tools are applied to the reduced subnetwork of
the anomalous nodes identified from the first stage to uncover anomalous structure. Simulated
cell phone communication as well as real-time press and media summary data are investigated
to validate the method. This approach does not distinguish between point anomaly and group
anomaly, hence hard to evaluate.
To further account for the dynamic nature of social media, [57] generalizes GLAD to the
d-GLAD model as an extension for handling time series and formulate the problem as a change
point detection task. The paper models the temporal evolution of the role mixture rate for
each group with a series of multivariate Gaussian distributions. At a particular time point,
the Gaussian has its mean as the value of the mixture rate. And the mixture rate of the next
time point is a normalized sample from this Gaussian distribution. Since the model requires
the mixture rate to be the parameters of a multivariate distribution over features, the authors
apply a soft-max function to normalize the sample drawn from the multivariate Gaussian. The
soft-max function is defined as S(θm) =
exp θm∑
m
exp θm
. When the total time length T equals one,
d-GLAD reduces to the GLAD model. Figure 7 depicts the probabilistic graphical model of
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d-GLAD. The model is demonstrated successful in detecting change in topics of the scientific
publications and party affiliation shift of US senators.
4 Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we present a survey of social media anomaly detection methods. Based on the
type of target anomalies, these methods fall into two categories: point anomaly detection and
group anomaly detection. Moreover, given the different formats of input information, they
can be further classified into activity-based approaches and graph-based approaches. For the
graph-based approaches, we divide the methodologies according to whether they consider the
time dynamics of the social graph.
One challenge in anomaly detection is to distinguish between data errors and the “genuine”
anomalies, i.e, those that were caused by the change in the underlying data distribution. As
in most cases, it is very difficult to obtain the ground truth labels for the anomalies. We
usually ignore the differences before conducting the anomaly detection. Only after we obtain
the detection results and perform detailed analysis can we tease out the data error and recognize
the “genuine” anomalies.
In summary, social media anomaly detection is still at an early stage. Most existing methods
rely heavily on the specific application and self-defined anomalies. Some of the reviewed methods
are originally designed for other related purposes, such as community monitoring and proximity
tracking, instead of anomaly detection. In addition, many of the existing methods deal with
memory-resident graphs, while real life social networks are often too large to fit into the memory.
Distributed and online social network anomaly detection are two promising areas. In the case of
very large social networks, new techniques for effectively summarizing the entire social network
are also needed.
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